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Abstract  
 
We test if analysts display multiple biases in forecasting the Institute for Supply Management’s 
(ISM) manufacturing Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI). We adopt a test that does not require 
knowledge of the forecaster’s prior information set and is robust to rational clustering, correlated 
forecast errors and outliers. We find that analysts forecast the PMI poorly and display multiple 
biases when forecasting. In particular, forecasters anti-herd and anti-anchor. Anti-herding 
supports a reputation-based notion that forecasters are rewarded not only for forecast accuracy 
but also for being the best forecast at a single point in time. Anti-anchoring is consistent with 
forecasters overreacting to private information. The two biases show a strong positive correlation 
suggesting that the incentives that elicit anti-herding also elicit anti-anchoring behavior. Both 
biases result in larger absolute errors, although the effect is stronger for anti-herding.  
JEL classification: C83, D83, E44, G17, G24 
Keywords: (Anti)-Herding; (Anti)-anchoring; PMI; forecast accuracy; panel data; multiple biases 
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Herding and Anchoring in Macroeconomic Forecasts: The Case of the PMI 
 
1 Introduction 
The impact of new information on asset prices is central to our understanding of price 
discovery and the valuation process. To track information about the economy and the business 
cycle, analysts and investors use economic indicators such as payrolls data, GDP, and retail sales 
as a guide. Economic agents form expectations of these indicators and the “news” or “surprise” 
in such data releases is measured relative to these expectations. In efficient markets, only 
unanticipated information should impact asset prices. Consequently, a large literature has tracked 
the impact of the unexpected component of these data releases on asset prices (see Gilbert, 
Scotti, Strasser and Vega, 2015, and references therein). A critical component of the reaction of 
economic agents to new information centers on the expectations regarding that piece of data. 
Professional forecasters provide forecasts of economic data prior to the announcement of the 
actual data. The median or mean of the survey responses is then viewed as the “consensus” 
estimate for that piece of data. Asset market responses to such data releases are based on the 
extent to which the actual data are higher or lower than the consensus expectation. In other 
words, the news or surprise that asset markets react to is really forecast error.  
The literature examining analysts’ forecasts of macroeconomic indicators is not as deep 
as the literature for corporate earnings. In particular, there is a dearth of work dealing with bias 
in macroeconomic time-series. Schuh (2001) found that individual forecasts of U.S. GDP were 
either all good (unbiased and efficient) or all bad (biased and inefficient) pointing to differential 
ability among forecasters. More recent work has focused on behavioral explanations for forecast 
errors. Lansing and Pyle (2015) point to persistent bias in the track records of professional 
forecasters with respect to growth, inflation and unemployment. They conclude that the evidence 
raises doubts about rational expectations. Allowing for departures from rational expectations in 
economic models would be a way to more accurately capture features of real-world behavior.1 
In this study, we test whether professionals exhibit behavioral biases in forecasting a key 
macroeconomic data series. The implications of forecasters using behavioral heuristics is that 
                                                          
1 Loungani (2002), states “the record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished.” This conclusion was 
based on the finding that only two of the 60 recessions that occurred around the world during the 1990s were 
predicted by forecasters a year in advance. About 40 of the 60 impending recessions remained undetected seven 
months before they occurred. 
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forecasts may be systematically biased and/or inefficient. In particular, we examine forecasts for 
evidence of herding and anchoring. Herding refers to imitation behavior whereby analysts 
underweight or abandon their own private information in favor of group or leader opinion (e.g. 
Truman (1994); DeBondt and Forbes (1999)). Anti-herding or bold forecasting suggests that 
analysts systematically scatter their forecasts away from the forecasts of other analysts. Such 
behavior has been found in a variety of survey sources such as Consensus Economics, 
Livingston, Wall Street Journal, and OECD, and forecasts such as housing values, oil prices, 
interest rates, inflation rates (e.g. Lamont 1995; Clement and Tse 2005; Nakazono 2013; 
Pierdzioch et al. 2013a). Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006), BCK hereafter, concluded 
that “analysts systematically issue anti-herding [earnings] forecasts that overemphasize their 
private information”.  
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic influences the way people intuitively assess 
probabilities. It refers to cases in which forecasts are anchored to some easily observable (usually 
uninformative) prior and leave out important information in forming and adjusting current 
forecasts. Campbell and Sharpe (2009) found consensus forecasts of several macroeconomic 
series anchored on the previous month’s release. Nakazono (2013) found that Federal Reserve 
officials (non-governors) tend to anchor on their own previous forecast. However, Pierdzioch 
and Rulke (2013b) report anti-anchoring or repelling forecast bias with respect to inflation 
forecasts relative to a central bank’s announced inflation target. In such cases, forecasts 
systematically deviate from the anchor and suggest over-reaction to new information.  
In this paper, we study individual forecasts of a key macroeconomic indicator, the 
Institute for Supply Management’s (ISM) manufacturing Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI). 
The PMI is a much-watched barometer of economic health because it is the first available 
indication of business conditions in the preceding month. 2 The subcomponents of the index are 
related to other useful pieces of information such as industrial production, durable goods orders, 
factory payrolls, producer price index and merchandise trade and are often used to forecast 
official data which are released several weeks later (Bachman 2010; Hess and Orbe 2013; Lahiri 
                                                          
2 Baumohl (2013, p. 184) writes that a PMI reading of 50 is “believed to be consistent with real GDP growth of 
about 2.5%. Every full point in the index above 50 can add another 0.3 percentage points or so of growth every 
year.” 
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and Monokroussos 2013).3 In their study on information content and timeliness, Gilbert et al. 
(2015) opine that the PMI, not nonfarm payrolls, might be the true “king of announcements.”   
 There are many issues with testing herding and anchoring in time series data. Hess and 
Orbe (2013) challenge the anchoring finding in Campbell and Sharpe (2009) arguing that time 
series tests of cognitive biases may generally be flawed if the prior information available to 
participants is not properly controlled for. Moreover, unanticipated market shocks could cause all 
forecasts to appear clustered, and exceed or fall short of announced values. Further, clustered 
forecasts need not imply that analysts herd (Bernhardt et al. 2006). This is because forecasters 
may share the same public information and the same established techniques and relationships. 
When a forecaster’s incentive structure or loss function cannot be observed, the issue must be 
empirically sorted out.  
We adopt an empirical approach to test for anchoring and herding in analysts’ forecasts 
that does not require knowledge of the forecasting model used by forecasters. The test, based on 
the work of BCK (2006), is robust to the shape of the forecaster’s loss function and the test 
statistic is invariant to whether the forecaster targets the mean or median of an asymmetric 
distribution of the variable under investigation. This test also accounts for rational clustering and 
is impervious to the choice of anchor. Importantly, the test statistic is robust to correlated 
forecast errors and to the occurrence of major disruptive events (e.g. the credit crisis) and outliers 
(Pierdzioch and Rulke 2013b). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use PMI forecasts as reported by 
Bloomberg, the most widely used news service in the finance industry, for purposes of studying 
behavioral biases. We present evidence for the first time on herding related to the ISM series. We 
also present an approach to studying herding and anchoring in time series data where only single 
forecasts of a fixed horizon event exist, i.e. there are no observable forecast revisions. In the case 
of herding, we construct an evolving consensus, as in BCK (2006), to circumvent a look-ahead 
bias. We explicitly control for the credit crisis, macroeconomic uncertainty and forecaster 
experience. Finally, we examine the impact of forecast bias on forecast accuracy. 
                                                          
3 The ISM website cites Joseph E. Stiglitz, former chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors, 
as saying, “The [ISM] Manufacturing [index]…has one of the shortest reporting lags of any macro-economic series 
and gives an important early look at the economy. It also measures some concepts (such as lead times and delivery 
lags) that can be found nowhere else. It makes an important contribution to the American statistical system and to 
economic policy.” Lahiri and Monokroussos (2013) add that, “..because of their nature as survey responses, ISM 
data are typically subject to small revisions at most. As such, they preserve most of the real-time nature that is 
crucial in many estimation and forecasting exercises…” 
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In our panel data study, we find that analysts forecast the PMI poorly. Forecasts appear to 
be pessimistic and forecast errors are elevated in times of uncertainty. Our tests point to strong 
evidence of anti-herding and anti-anchoring in the cross section of forecasting firms. Moreover, 
anti-herding and anti-anchoring appear to go together. Both biases cause larger absolute errors, 
although the effect is stronger for anti-herding.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes some key literature; 
sections 3 and 4 describe the methodology and data, respectively; section 5 contains the 
empirical findings regarding herding and anchoring, section 6 contains a discussion of forecast 
bias and forecast accuracy, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Herding may arise for a number of reasons. For instance, analysts may lack confidence in 
their private information and/or there is uncertainty concerning public information 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Herding may increase with task difficulty (Kim and Pantzalis 2003), 
when analysts’ private signal is pessimistic (Olsen 1996), or when analysts want to signal that 
their information is correlated with their peers (Truman 1994). Compensation-based herding 
arises when analysts fear penalties for being incorrect (e.g. Hong et al. 2000). There is also some 
evidence that herding may be culturally motivated (Ashiya and Doi 2001).  
Why might forecasters anti-herd? Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) argue that 
forecasters are rewarded not only for forecast accuracy but, most importantly, for being the best 
forecast at a single point in time. The latter gives rise to forecast heterogeneity and thus anti-
herding. Their model depends on the positive recognition of forecasters who, in any given 
period, prove to be the most accurate (e.g. through ranking systems or awards for best 
forecasters). This publicity enhances a forecaster’s reputation, credibility and name recognition.4 
In a similar vein, Effinger and Polborn (2001) point out that much of the herding literature 
implicitly assumes that the remuneration of experts does not depend directly on whether their 
predictions are right. Therefore, the key incentive to forecast correctly is reputation. However, 
when the expert’s value is additionally dependent on how many other experts are competing with 
him, then the value of hiring an able forecaster drops as the number of competing experts 
                                                          
4 When we asked an award-winning analyst what the incentive was to turn in a forecast to Bloomberg, he replied, 
“Pride, publicity, and career advancement via name recognition from the Bloomberg posting.” 
5 
 
increases. Consequently, the expert is most valuable when he is the only able expert. In this 
scenario, if the value of being the best is sufficiently large relative to the value of being one of 
several able experts, then anti-herding becomes attractive. 
No universal measure of herding exists. Most attempts at detecting herding do so by 
estimating the deviation of each forecast from the mean or median of all forecasts reported in the 
forecasting cycle (see Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005). Gallo, Granger, and Jeon (2002) 
find that GDP forecasts converge as the date on which GDP is announced draws nearer, but that 
final forecasts are either uniformly too low or too high. Pons-Novell (2003) finds that in the 
unemployment rate forecasts from the Livingston Survey, forecasters in some sectors anti-herd 
and forecasters in other sectors herd toward the consensus. 
Bewley and Fiebig (2002) analyze the interest rate forecasts of 104 forecasters for eight 
countries taken from Consensus Economics and find that more than half of the forecasters have 
significant herding tendencies, and the degree of herding behavior increases with the volatility of 
interest rates, i.e. with forecast difficulty.5 Pierdzioch and Rulke (2013a) study interest rate 
forecasts from the Livingston Survey. They apply the BCK test and find evidence of anti-
herding, contrary to Bewley and Fiebig (2002), and that anti-herding results in lower forecast 
accuracy. They speculate that forecasters might have a non-standard loss function as described 
by Laster et al. (1999). Similarly, Pierdzioch et al. (2013b) find pervasive anti-herding in Wall 
Street Journal survey data on housing starts and housing price changes.  Pierdzioch et al. (2016) 
find evidence of time-varying bias, i.e. South African forecasters of the inflation rate herd in 
times of heightened uncertainty and anti-herd in times of stability. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) report that anchoring appears to be pervasive in financial 
decision-making and to be undiminished by task familiarity or financial incentives. Amir and 
Ganzach (1998) point out that anchored  forecasts underweight the forecaster’s private 
information and are biased toward the anchor (i.e. overweighting past information). Campbell 
and Sharpe (2009) find that consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases display anchoring 
and are systematically biased toward the value of the previous month’s release. In their test, the 
null hypothesis of no bias is tested against an alternative of anchoring. Other tests of anchoring 
use alternative anchors: the analyst’s previous forecast (Nakazono 2013), or the current or lagged 
                                                          
5 They use the term herding to denote the tendency to produce a range of forecasts which is narrower than that which 
would likely be observed if the forecasts were produced on a strictly independent basis because a forecaster takes 
the previous consensus mean into account.  
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median forecast (Nakazono (2013); Cen et al. (2013)). Campbell and Sharpe (2009) and Hess 
and Orbe (2013) use the previous month’s level of the PMI as the anchor in analyzing forecasts 
of the ISM. However, Hess and Orbe argue that analysts use more information than is assumed 
by the Campbell and Sharpe test. They construct an ad hoc information set comprising other 
macroeconomic data that analysts may have access to and find that this additional information 
accounts for more than half of the overall anchoring bias coefficient. They however, do not 
provide an improved test of anchoring.  
Nakazano (2013) conducted a joint test of herding and anchoring using a test similar to 
Campbell and Sharpe and found that Fed governors herd to the previous consensus and deviate 
from their own previous forecasts. They report that non-governors tend to anti-herd and anchor 
on their previous forecast. Pierdzioch and Rulke (2013b) adapt the BCK approach to test whether 
a central bank’s declared inflation target serves to anchor or repel inflation forecasts collected by 
Consensus Economics. From data for 22 countries, they conclude that forecasters appear to 
scatter their inflation forecasts away from the inflation target, suggesting that the target repels 
rather than anchors inflation expectations at least in the short run. They offer no explanation for 
this phenomenon. 
Why might forecasters anti-anchor? While there does not appear to be much theory to 
address this question, we suggest that anti-anchoring may be viewed as the opposite of 
anchoring, i.e. forecasters overweight their private information and systematically deviate from 
an anchor. This behavior might be especially dominant if forecasters believe other forecasters 
tend to anchor on a particular anchor, e.g. the previous month’s value of a macroeconomic 
variable. We speculate that, consistent with Laster et al (1999), forecasters will tend to deviate 
from observable anchors if they are motivated to be the best forecaster among a large group of 
forecasters. Such incentives will also lead forecasters to make bold forecasts and consequently to 
anti-herd. 
In sum, the evidence appears to be mixed regarding (anti-)herding and (anti-)anchoring 
tendencies among macroeconomic forecasters. We empirically explore this issue further.  
 
3 Methodology 
To uncover herding and anchoring behavior, we rely on the BCK test. To illustrate how 
the test works, it is useful to consider a forecaster who forms an efficient private forecast that 
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uses all available information to form a posterior distribution over the PMI. We notate this 
unobservable optimal forecast as *tF . The forecast is unbiased if the forecast is equal to the 
posterior estimate of the median or mean of the PMI. However, the forecaster may issue 
forecasts (Ft) that are biased. The probability that an unbiased private forecast overshoots or 
undershoots the announced PMI (At) is 0.5, and this probability should be unrelated to the 
consensus forecast, tF . Accordingly,  
Prob (Ft > At | Ft > tF  , At ≠ Ft) = 0.5  and Prob (Ft < At | Ft < tF  , At ≠ Ft) = 0.5   (1) 
Herding arises if a published forecast is biased towards the consensus forecast. If the 
biased published forecast exceeds the consensus forecast then we have tF < Ft <
*
tF , i.e. the 
forecast will be located between the consensus and his best estimate. As a result, the probability 
that the biased published forecast overshoots the PMI will be less than 0.5. Similarly, if the 
biased published forecast is less than the consensus forecast then we have tF > Ft >
*
tF , and the 
probability that the biased published forecast undershoots the PMI also will be less than 0.5. 
Notating z+ as the event that the forecast overshoots the consensus (Ft > tF ), and z- as the event 
that the forecast undershoots the consensus (Ft < tF ), herding implies that 
Prob (Ft > At | z+, At ≠ Ft) < 0.5 and Prob (Ft < At | z-, At ≠ Ft) < 0.5    (2) 
Anti-herding implies that forecasters try to differentiate their forecasts from the forecasts 
of others. In such cases, the published forecast will be further away from the consensus forecast 
than the private forecast. Accordingly, tF < 
*
tF < Ft and Ft <
*
tF < tF  , and the probabilities of 
overshooting or undershooting the PMI will be greater than 0.5.  Anti-herding implies that:  
Prob (At < Ft | z+, At ≠ Ft) > 0.5 and Prob (At > Ft | z- , At ≠ Ft) > 0.5    (3)  
The non-parametric herding statistic, SH, proposed by BCK is the average of the sample 
estimates of the overshooting and undershooting conditional probabilities. The test statistic is 
constructed as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻(𝑧𝑧+, 𝑧𝑧−) = 12 �∑𝛿𝛿𝜏𝜏+∑𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏+ + ∑𝛿𝛿𝜏𝜏−∑𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏−�          (4) 
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where γ+ and γ- are conditioning indicator functions such that γ+ = 1 if z+ occurred, zero 
otherwise. Likewise, γ- =1 if z- occurred, zero otherwise. Similarly, δ+ and δ- are overshooting 
binary indicator functions such that δ+ = 1 if z+ occurred and Ft > At, while δ- = 1 if z- occurred 
and Ft < At. 
 Under the null, SH = 0.5. When SH < 0.5, the test suggests herding, and when SH > 0.5, 
the test suggests anti-herding.  The herding statistic has an asymptotic normal distribution under 
the null hypothesis that forecasters form unbiased forecasts with mean of 0.5 and variance of 
1
16
�
1
∑𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏
+ + 1∑𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏−�. 
In the case of anchoring, Pierdzioch and Rulke (2013b) apply the BCK test to show that 
anchoring arises if a published forecast is biased towards the anchor. In this adaptation of the 
BCK test, the consensus forecast is replaced with the hypothesized anchor, 𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡. The overshooting 
and undershooting probabilities and the S-statistic (SA) are computed similarly to (2), (3) and (4) 
above. Similar to the herding case, under the null, SA = 0.5. When SA < 0.5, the test suggests 
anchoring, and when SA > 0.5, the test suggests repelling or anti-anchoring. 
 
4 Data 
The ISM manufacturing survey goes out to more than 300 corporate purchasing managers 
and supply executives representing 20 different industries (Baumohl, 2013). Respondents are 
asked to assess whether activity is better/same/worse relative to the previous month in the 
following ten areas: New Orders, Production, Employment, Supplier Deliveries, Inventories, 
Customers’ Inventories, Prices, Backlog of Orders, New Export Orders and Imports.6,7 We focus 
on the purchasing manager’s index (PMI) which is an equally-weighted composite diffusion 
index based on the first five subcomponents, and is released on the first business day of each 
month.   
                                                          
6 The backlog index compares current month unfilled orders with the prior month. The inventory index compares 
current month units on hand, not the dollar value, with the prior month. 
7 Specifically, five types of choices are offered as follows: For new orders, production and exports, the choices are 
better/same/worse; for employment, inventories, prices and imports, the choices are higher/same/lower; for supplier 
deliveries, the choices are slower/same/faster; for customer inventories, the choices are too high/about right/too low; 
and for order backlogs, the choices are greater/same/less. 
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Our sample is comprised of analysts’ forecasts of monthly ISM announcements from 
1998:6 to 2014:4, a total of 191 event days, as reported by Bloomberg.8 The number of monthly 
individual analyst estimates for all announcements ranges from 3 to 88, with an average of 62. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firm-forecasts across the sample. There were a total of 11,842 
individual forecast observations generated by 224 different firms. Figure 2 show the distribution 
of firms by number of forecasts. There were 123 firms with more than 20 forecasts; of these, 19 
firms provided more than 150 forecasts in the sample. Later, we use this information to classify 
firms into more-/less-experienced forecaster quartiles. 
Bloomberg sends monthly questionnaires to a list of analysts and economists asking for 
their forecasts of various macroeconomic indicators. Bloomberg publishes the forecasts as they 
come in (Pierdzioch, Reid and Gupta, 2016). Forecasts are marked with a date, with several 
forecasts marked with the same date. A limitation of the dataset is that while we have data on all 
forecasts that Bloomberg published for a particular event date, we cannot precisely track a 
forecaster’s information set. This limitation is important because the herding test requires 
knowledge of a consensus forecast. Pierdzioch et al. (2016) correctly point out that while early 
forecasters are likely to have limited information on the forecasts of other forecasters, late 
forecasters can take into account a potentially large number of forecasts when submitting a 
forecast. A direct consequence is that we have to make an assumption as to what forecasters 
know about the forecasts of others when making their forecasts. An additional limitation of the 
Bloomberg dataset is that we are unable to unambiguously separate forecasters by type, e.g. buy-
side versus sell-side, or by industry.     
Figure 3 plots the PMI over the sample period along with the standard deviation of 
forecasts for each event. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics. Raw forecast errors are defined 
as the announced PMI minus the forecast PMI. Consensus forecasts are defined as the median of 
all forecasts for each event. We find that the mean monthly consensus forecast error (FE) is no 
different from zero. Thus, consensus forecasts appear to be unconditionally unbiased. However, 
the mean individual forecast error is significantly positive (i.e. 0.21) suggesting that, on average, 
forecasters were pessimistic and underestimated the announced value of the PMI. Predictably, 
individual errors are also more volatile than the consensus errors judging by the standard 
                                                          
8 While consensus forecasts are available going back to 1992, individual analyst forecasts are only available from 
June 1998.  
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deviations of the errors. Interestingly, mean individual and consensus forecast errors are 
significantly higher than the errors from a naïve AR(1) forecast, i.e. forecasts equal to last 
period’s PMI. Absolute forecast errors (AFE) and absolute percent forecast errors (APFE), i.e. 
absolute errors scaled by the announced value, are also larger and more volatile for individuals 
compared to the consensus. However, absolute forecast errors are smaller than naïve absolute 
forecast errors, suggesting that analysts might well be adding value. 
Is forecasting more difficult in times of elevated uncertainty? We explore this issue by 
characterizing general macroeconomic uncertainty along three dimensions: 1) recessions as dated 
by the NBER; 2) the credit crisis dated from 2007:1 to 2009:6; and 3) the Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Index (EPUI) as presented by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013). In the case of the 
EPUI, we classify months when the EPUI increased from the previous month as times of 
elevated uncertainty.  
In Table 2, we report means and standard deviations for absolute percent forecast errors. 
Such scaling is necessary to make errors comparable by accommodating increases and decreases 
in the PMI at different times in the business cycle. We find that absolute percent errors were 
larger and more volatile during periods of heightened uncertainty for both consensus and 
individual forecast errors. The errors appear to be largest during recessions. Interestingly, naïve 
forecast errors are much larger than analyst errors in such times of uncertainty suggesting that 
even though errors are exaggerated in such times, analysts add value to the forecasting process.  
 Tests of herding and anchoring require knowledge of what it is forecasters herd toward 
or anchor on. In the case of anchoring, we choose the previous month’s announced value of the 
PMI as the anchor, following Campbell and Sharpe (2009) and Hess and Orbe (2013). In the case 
of herding, we follow BCK and use the evolving current consensus, defined as the median of 
forecasts issued prior to the forecast in question. While forecasts are added every day to the 
portal beginning up to 4 weeks prior to the announcement, the vast majority of forecasts are 
posted on the Friday preceding the announcement, i.e. 3 to 7 days prior to the announcement.  
We construct the current median for all forecasts prior to the announcement day. For 
instance, for those who report 7 days prior to an announcement, the median of all previously 
reported forecasts is considered to be the consensus. For those who reported 5 days prior to the 
announcement, the median of all reported forecasts up through  day -6 is considered to be the 
consensus, and so on. Note that we include day 0, i.e. the announcement day, because on some 
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occasions Bloomberg uploads forecasts that come in earlier that morning prior to the release of 
the indicator. 
The anchoring-and-adjustment bias refers to forecasts that are anchored to some easily 
observable prior thereby leaving out important information in forming current forecasts. In 
particular, when analysts generate numerical estimates of uncertain quantities, adjustments away 
from some initial value or anchor are often insufficient. In other words, anchoring suggests 
under-reaction to new information. Anti-anchoring, by contrast, would suggest over-reaction to 
new information. Initially, we run the BCK test using the previous month’s announced PMI as 
the anchor. We also experiment with alternative anchors including the prior period median 
forecast and prior individual/own forecast. 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Do analysts herd?  
Table 3 contains results of the BCK test of herding. As previously mentioned, we 
construct the current evolving consensus to prevent a look-ahead bias and ensure that 
information would be observable by forecasters. In the panel data set, we find pervasive evidence 
of anti-herding for days -7 through day 0. Analysts appear to position their forecasts away from 
the consensus. Cross-sectionally, we find that for the 158 firms with 10 or more forecasts, 
roughly 40% exhibit anti-herding and 60% exhibit no bias according to the BCK test. 
To examine the time-series properties of the bias, we calculate S-statistics by year. In 
Table 4, we report results beginning with 1999 to ensure we have enough forecasts to conduct 
the test. We find no evidence of time variation in anti-herding: of the 16 years examined, 15 
(93%) are characterized by anti-herding, and only 1 is characterized as no bias.  
 
5.2 Herding robustness tests 
We conduct several tests of the robustness of the (anti-)herding finding. These results are 
contained in Table 5. We examine herding in sub-samples based on the previously mentioned 
periods of uncertainty. We also examined the possibility that herding might be related to 
forecaster experience by segregating forecasters into experience quartiles. Here, we used the 
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number of firm forecasts as a proxy for experience.9 We also estimated the S-statistic after 
dividing the sample into pessimistic and optimistic forecasts. Here, pessimistic (optimistic) 
forecasts were classified based on whether the analyst’s forecast was lower (higher) than his 
previous forecast. Finally, we examined herding in periods of high/low PMI volatility, a proxy 
for forecast (task) difficulty. Such periods of high/low volatility were based on Pierdzioch et al 
(2016): In a low-volatility regime, the absolute change in the PMI from the previous month is 
smaller than or equal to its unconditional full sample mean; in a high-volatility regime, the 
absolute change in the PMI from the previous month is larger than its unconditional full sample 
mean. In each case, we found pervasive evidence of anti-herding.  Boldness appears to be a 
systematic characteristic of forecasts of the PMI.10  
 
5.3 Do analysts anchor? 
The BCK test is easily adapted to a test for anchoring. In the panel data set, we find 
pervasive evidence of anti-anchoring for the full sample with an S-statistic of 0.5617. When we 
run the BCK test by analyst-firm, using the previous month’s announced PMI as the anchor, we 
find that in the cross section of firms with ten or more forecasts, roughly 18% exhibit an anti-
anchoring (or repelling) bias. Interestingly, and in contrast to a broader result presented in 
Campbell and Sharpe (2009), there is no evidence of anchoring at the firm level.  
To get a sense of the time series properties of the S-statistic, we generate S-statistics by 
year using all forecasts in a particular year. In Table 6, we find that about 68.5% of the time 
either anchoring (12.5%) or anti-anchoring (56%) bias is evident. For the overall sample, the test 
clearly indicates anti-anchoring. The time variation in the (collective) bias is interesting and is 
not related to periods of uncertainty. A deeper exploration of this time variation is the subject of 
a future study.   
 
5.4 Anchoring robustness tests 
                                                          
9 We also examined the impact of forecast number on forecast bias. We collected all the first forecasts of firms, then 
all the second forecasts and so on. We truncated the sample where we had minimally 10 analysts/firms, i.e. at 168 
forecasts. We found pervasive anti-herding. 
10 Pierdzioch et al (2016) examined herding to the previous period’s consensus on grounds that expectation 
formation shows features of adaptive learning (Ehlers and Steinbach, 2007). Although we disagree with this 
approach to testing for herding, we reexamined the overall sample results for herding to the previous period’s 
median forecast and found pervasive anti-herding. 
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As further checks on the robustness of our findings, we run the BCK test on sub-samples 
based on the previously mentioned periods of uncertainty, and using alternative anchors such as 
the prior period median forecasts and prior individual/own forecasts. These results are contained 
in Table 7. We find that the anti-anchoring bias dominates and is unaffected by macroeconomic 
uncertainty or choice of anchor. 
  
6 Behavioral biases and forecast accuracy 
Our empirical tests show that forecasters exhibit both anti-herding and anti-anchoring 
characteristics. To examine the relationship between the two biases, we calculate the correlation 
between forecaster-specific S-statistics, i.e. SH and SA. The two biases show a strong positive 
correlation of +0.60, which can also be seen in Figure 4. In other words, anti-herding and anti-
anchoring behavior go together. This is consistent with Laster et al (1999) and the notion that 
forecaster incentive structures reward only the best forecast, which elicits anti-herding behavior. 
In turn, such behavior might reasonably result in forecasters overreacting to their own private 
information compared to random anchors, consistent with anti-anchoring behavior.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between individual forecast bias and individual 
forecast accuracy. To do so, we estimate a model similar to that in Pierdzioch and Rulke (2013a), 
whereby we regress the average forecaster-specific absolute forecast errors and the absolute 
percent forecast errors on forecaster-specific S-statistics for herding and anchoring.  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖         (5)  
Table 8 contains the results of these regressions. We find a positive relationship between 
the S-statistic and forecast error. While the relationship is strongly significant in the case of (anti-
)herding, the relationship is not statistically significant in the case of (anti-)anchoring. The 
herding result indicates that cross-sectional anti-herding results in larger absolute errors, 
consistent with Pierdzioch and Rulke (2013a).  
  
7 Conclusion  
 
In this study, we test whether professionals exhibit behavioral biases in forecasting a key 
macroeconomic data series. The implications of forecasters using behavioral heuristics is that 
forecasts may be systematically biased and/or inefficient. In particular, we examine forecasts for 
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evidence of herding and anchoring. We study Bloomberg-reported consensus and individual 
forecasts of the ISM’s manufacturing PMI from 1998:6 to 2014:4. 
 We find evidence of anti-herding and anti-anchoring in individual forecasts of the PMI. 
Our results are at odds with Campbell and Sharpe (2009) who found evidence of anchoring. Our 
findings, however, are consistent with Pierdzioch et al. (2013a, 2013b) and others who found 
anti-herding and anti-anchoring in other macroeconomic series.  
Our anti-herding findings support the notion that forecasters are rewarded not only for 
forecast accuracy but for being the best forecast at a single point in time as in Laster et al (1999). 
This is especially true when forecasts are subject to media attention. This publicity enhances a 
forecaster’s reputation, credibility and name recognition and increases the incentive to deviate 
from the crowd. Our anti-anchoring findings suggest that analysts use a wide variety of 
information in their forecasts consistent with Hess and Orbe (2013). We find a close correlation 
between anti-herding and anti-anchoring suggesting that the two behaviors appear to go together.  
We find mixed evidence regarding the correlation between individual measures of bias 
and forecast accuracy: while anti-anchoring does not appear to be related to forecast accuracy, 
anti-herding causes a deterioration in forecast accuracy.  
Developing a more comprehensive theory to explain anti-anchoring could be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. Future research could also add value by adapting the BCK test to 
accommodate joint tests of two or more biases. More transparent forecaster/firm characteristics 
such as gender, experience and size, and better information on the timing of forecasts would 
allow for cleaner tests of herding.  
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Fig. 1 Number of PMI forecasts: June 1998 to April 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Number of forecasts per firm 
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Fig. 3 Announced PMI and forecast volatility 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Relationship between biases 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
 
 FE  AFE  APFE  
Consensus Forecasts 
N 191  191  191  
Mean 0.12  1.53  *** 2.98  *** 
Std. Deviation 1.99  1.27  2.53  
Individual Forecasts 
N 11,842  11,842  11,842  
Mean 0.21 *** 1.73 *** 3.35 *** 
Std. Deviation 2.21  1.38  2.75  
Naive Forecasts 
N 190  190  190  
Mean 0.01  1.84 *** 3.62 *** 
Std. Deviation 2.39  1.52  3.10  
Notes: FE are forecast errors computed as Announced – Forecast; AFE are absolute forecast errors; APFE are 
absolute percentage forecast errors, i.e. absolute forecast errors scaled by the announced value and multiplied by 
100. Naïve forecast is an AR(1) change in the announced, i.e. At – At-1. *** are significant at 1% or better. 
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Table 2  
Forecast errors in times of uncertainty   
 
 
Economic 
State 
Consensus APFE Individual APFE Naïve APFE  
Mean 
Forecast 
Dispersion N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Full Sample 191 2.9840 2.5159 11,842 3.3464 2.7535 191 3.6267 3.1720 0.9337 
Recessions 28 4.2274 3.5090 1,721 4.6818 3.8731 28 5.4366 4.8700 1.0880 
Crisis 30 3.3760 3.2487 2,194 3.8576 3.4766 30 4.3539 3.9785 1.0020 
EPUI  89 3.4319 2.8972 5,544 3.7988 3.1058 89 3.9824 3.5197 0.9515 
 
Notes: 
Recessions are based on NBER dates; Crisis is the period 2007:1 to 2009:6 that captures the worst of the credit crisis. EPUI is the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2013). Periods when the EPUI increased are considered periods of elevated uncertainty. 
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Table 3  
Herding test using an evolving consensus  
 
 Day(s) Prior to 
Announcement 
 
N 
Prob 
(Ft>At|z+) 
Prob 
(Ft<At|z-) S 
Lower 
95% 
Upper  
95% 
 
Bias 
-7 1020 0.4790 0.7681 0.6235 0.5906 0.6565 Anti-herding 
-6 918 0.6100 0.5488 0.5794 0.5446 0.6142 Anti-herding 
-5 1057 0.6497 0.5686 0.6091 0.5775 0.6408 Anti-herding 
-4 1686 0.5366 0.7441 0.6404 0.6152 0.6655 Anti-herding 
-3 2504 0.5997 0.6737 0.6367 0.6159 0.6575 Anti-herding 
-2 443 0.7921 0.5521 0.6721 0.6227 0.7215 Anti-herding 
-1 750 0.6384 0.7027 0.6705 0.6321 0.7090 Anti-herding 
0 1253 0.5728 0.6371 0.6050 0.5751 0.6349 Anti-herding 
 
 
Table 4 
Herding test by year 
 
Year N S 
Lower  
95% 
Upper  
95% Bias 
1999 375 0.5858 0.5278 0.6438 Anti-Herding 
2000 412 0.6701 0.6157 0.7244 Anti-Herding 
2001 490 0.4953 0.4476 0.5431 No bias 
2002 623 0.6388 0.5958 0.6818 Anti-Herding 
2003 747 0.6408 0.6009 0.6807 Anti-Herding 
2004 799 0.7358 0.6978 0.7737 Anti-Herding 
2005 825 0.6303 0.5926 0.6681 Anti-Herding 
2006 817 0.5819 0.5455 0.6183 Anti-Herding 
2007 909 0.6707 0.6348 0.7066 Anti-Herding 
2008 869 0.6276 0.5919 0.6634 Anti-Herding 
2009 859 0.5882 0.5516 0.6249 Anti-Herding 
2010 901 0.6157 0.5810 0.6504 Anti-Herding 
2011 944 0.5979 0.5635 0.6323 Anti-Herding 
2012 948 0.6840 0.6487 0.7193 Anti-Herding 
2013 970 0.6181 0.5831 0.6530 Anti-Herding 
2014 313 0.6718 0.6084 0.7352 Anti-Herding 
Full 
Sample 11,181 0.6279 0.6181 0.6377 Anti-Herding 
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Table 5  
Herding: Robustness Tests 
 
 
N S 
Lower  
95% 
Upper  
95% Bias 
A. Periods of High/Low Uncertainty 
No Recession 9553 0.6328 0.6222 0.6435 Anti-Herding 
Recession 1628 0.6020 0.5766 0.6274 Anti-Herding 
No Crisis 9105 0.6219 0.6110 0.6328 Anti-Herding 
Crisis 2076 0.6539 0.6312 0.6767 Anti-Herding 
Below mean EPUI 6037 0.6368 0.6234 0.6502 Anti-Herding 
Above mean EPUI 5144 0.6175 0.6031 0.6320 Anti-Herding 
B. Forecaster Experience (# of forecasts) 
1 - 9 1676 0.6124 0.5869 0.6378 Anti-Herding 
10 – 29 2553 0.6489 0.6283 0.6696 Anti-Herding 
30 – 74 3479 0.6202 0.6026 0.6378 Anti-Herding 
75 – 119 1844 0.6307 0.6066 0.6548 Anti-Herding 
> 119 1629 0.6240 0.5982 0.6498 Anti-Herding 
C. Forecaster Optimism 
Pessimistic  4281 0.6060 0.5899 0.6221 Anti-Herding 
Neutral  753 0.6590 0.6207 0.6972 Anti-Herding 
Optimistic  4761 0.6420 0.6264 0.6576 Anti-Herding 
D. PMI Volatility 
Low  6782 0.6930 0.6804 0.7056 Anti-Herding 
High  4399 0.5286 0.5128 0.5443 Anti-Herding 
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Table 6  
Anchoring test by year  
 
 Year 
 
N 
Prob 
(Ft>At|z+) 
Prob 
(Ft<At|z-) S 
Lower 
95% 
Upper  
95% 
 
Bias 
1999 375 0.4485 0.6975 0.5730 0.5208 0.6251 Anti-anchoring 
2000 412 0.8755 0.2927 0.5841 0.5342 0.6341 Anti-anchoring 
2001 490 0.5085 0.4413 0.4749 0.4303 0.5195 Unbiased 
2002 623 0.5457 0.4454 0.4956 0.4546 0.5365 Unbiased 
2003 747 0.4498 0.2308 0.3403 0.3009 0.3797 Anchoring 
2004 799 0.6727 0.6625 0.6676 0.6285 0.7066 Anti-anchoring 
2005 825 0.5753 0.5992 0.5872 0.5516 0.6229 Anti-anchoring 
2006 817 0.7500 0.3798 0.5649 0.5302 0.5996 Anti-anchoring 
2007 909 0.4986 0.5287 0.5137 0.4797 0.5476 Unbiased 
2008 869 0.6646 0.6647 0.6647 0.6220 0.7073 Anti-anchoring 
2009 859 0.3361 0.5898 0.4630 0.4263 0.4996 Anchoring 
2010 901 0.3176 0.6949 0.5063 0.4699 0.5427 Unbiased 
2011 944 0.5038 0.7013 0.6026 0.5700 0.6351 Anti-anchoring 
2012 948 0.6730 0.5494 0.6112 0.5787 0.6437 Anti-anchoring 
2013 970 0.3686 0.8193 0.5939 0.5616 0.6263 Anti-anchoring 
2014 313 0.5298 0.4894 0.5096 0.4522 0.5670 Unbiased 
 
Full 
Sample 11,842 0.5308 0.5926 0.5617 0.5526 0.5709 Anti-anchoring 
 
 
Table 7  
Anchoring: Robustness tests 
 
 N S Upper 95% Lower 95% Bias 
A. Periods of High/Low Uncertainty 
No recessions 10121 0.5724 0.5624 0.5824 Anti-Anchoring 
Recessions 1721 0.5613 0.5368 0.5859 Anti-Anchoring 
No crisis 9648 0.5709 0.5607 0.5811 Anti-Anchoring 
Crisis  2194 0.5742 0.5518 0.5967 Anti-Anchoring 
Below mean EPUI 6447 0.5891 0.5765 0.6017 Anti-Anchoring 
Above mean EPUI 5395 0.5535 0.5399 0.5671 Anti-Anchoring 
B. Different Anchors 
Anchor = prior 
period consensus 11830 0.5148 0.5055 0.5241 Anti-Anchoring 
Anchor = prior own 
forecast 10171 0.5224 0.5122 0.5325 Anti-Anchoring 
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Table 8 
Forecast bias and forecast accuracy 
 
Dependent Variable N α β R2 
 
(Anti-)Herding 
Absolute Error 188 1.4878 
(0.0000) 
0.3424 
(0.0122) 
0.0333 
Absolute Percent Error 188 0.0289 
(0.0000) 
0.0061 
(0.0396) 
0.0226 
 
(Anti-)Anchoring 
Absolute Error 192 1.6150 
(0.0000) 
0.1629 
(0.3093) 
0.0054 
Absolute Percent Error 192 0.0310 
(0.0000) 
0.0031 
(0.9301) 
0.0045 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
